NA by Poerwowidagdo, Sapto J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1980
Reduced order models via continued fractions
applied to control systems.
Poerwowidagdo, Sapto J.











AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF ARMS




Thesis Advisor: D. C. Boger
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
*i r\ -7 ii ~%l







2. GOVT ACCESSION NO » REORIENTS CATALOG NuMIE*
4 Title ,«ia Ju»hih)
An Econometric Analysis of Arms Transfers to the
ASEAN Countries
1. TYRE OF MFOUT * RERIOO COVERCO
Master's Thesis (Sept 1980)
«- PERFORMING ORG. "t»0"T NUMIER
7. AuTmO^U S CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMlENMj
Sapto J. Poerwowidagdo
I PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME amO ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
»0. MOONAH ELCMCNT. FNOjECT. TASK
AREA * mom ft UNIT NUMIERS





<» NUMIER OF PAGES
87




IH OECLASSIFIC ATI ON/ OORN GRADING
SCHEDULE
l». DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (at (hit *—rt)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT fol torn oomtroel ontoroo" In Bloat 20, II dlliotont trmm Xooort)
10. JU»»L ENENT4RY NOTES






20 ABSTRACT (Conllnuo on rovoroo oldo II noeoooory mn4 loomity oy mloem •mot)
An econometric analysis was carried out on military
P9rts data for ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asia Nat
single and simultaneous equation models. A forecasting
lowing the econometric model. Both models were applied
data for observations during 1968-1976. The empirical
model demonstrated the simultaneity of the two variable
the forecasting model encouraged trie use of the lagged
values of military expenditures and arms imports. Both
policy analysis of the arms transfers within the ASEAN
expenditures and arms 1m-
ions) countries using both
model was developed fol-
to actual arms transfers
result of the econometric
s above and the result of
variables to predict the
models are useful in the
cnuntrips .
DO ' omuFM I JAN 71 1473 EOlTiOM of I MOV «B is OBSOLETE
S/N 103-0 14- 4«0 1 Unclassified

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited,
An Econometric Analysis of Arms




B.S., Indonesian Naval Academy, 1968
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of






An econometric analysis was carried out on military expenditures
and arms imports data for ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asia Nations)
countries using both single and simultaneous equation models. A fore-
casting model was developed following the econometric model. Both models
were applied to actual arms transfers data for observations during 1968-
1976. The empirical result of the econometric model demonstrated the
simultaneity of the two variables above and the result of the forecasting
model encouraged the use of the lagged variables to predict the values of
military expenditures and arms imports. Both models are useful in the
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Since the downfall of South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to the com-
munists, the USA and Western countries have decreased their direct in-
volvements in Southeast Asia. Indirectly, there has been a slight in-
creasing of the flows of arms to the non-communist countries in this
region.
This thesis develops, via econometric analysis, the issues of arms
transfers specifically into ASEAN countries, all of which are non-
communist countries.
Chapter Two reviews the background of ASEAN, its historical, geo-
graphical, socio-economical
,
political and military aspects. It also
reviews arms transfer in general and specifically within ASEAN nations.
Econometric and forecasting models are built up and examined in the
third chapter.
Chapter Four analyzes and discusses the results for individual
countries and for ASEAN alliance as a whole.
The last chapter concludes the analysis and discusses the possible




In this chapter, two areas of interest will be reviewed to give the
reader the background of the ASEAN and arms transfers before entering
the next chapters on the econometric side.




aspects are the five main points to be described to reveal the ASEAN
background and environment.
1 . Historical
In 1961, three of the Southeast Asian countries, Malaysia, the
Philippines and Thailand, linked themselves in the Association of South-
east Asian States (ASA). ASA was successful in creating the nucleus of
a regional association, ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions, established in Bangkok in 1967. In addition to the three
countries of ASA, ASEAN also included Indonesia and Singapore. [1J
The real purpose of ASEAN was to enable the new government of
Indonesia (post-Soekarno) to participate in an association for regional
development on equal terms with the ASA members. Singapore, which had
refused to join ASA was fortuitously able to enjoy the same privilege;
it could scarcely remain away from any regional organization in which
Indonesia took part, because this city (island) state hoped to promote
its own economic development through helping to rebuild the shattered
Indonesian economy. Consequently, as the most highly-developed state,
Singapore has perhaps the most to gain from greater regional integration,
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and so has been one of the organization's most active members.
ASEAN has established a regional identity within the United
Nations Economic and Social Council for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP,
formerly ECAFE). ASEAN has some modest schemes of cooperation in trans-
port and communications, fisheries, and education to its credit. ASEAN
has achieved a modest success in promoting certain aspects of the more
obvious and necessary forms of cooperation such as postal service and
telecommunication, transport facilities, fisheries and agricultural
techniques and has achieved some success in promoting higher scientific
and technical education in institutions serving the region as a whole.
With the expiration of SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization:
Thailand, Philippines, Pakistan, USA, Britain, New Zealand and Australia)
in 1975 and the fall of South Vietnam to communists, the USA and Western
countries viewed ASEAN as a balancing regional power against the spreading
communist expansion in this region. For that reason, arms transfers from
Western countries to ASEAN countries has been increasing considerably in
recent years. £ 1 3
2. Geographical (see Figure II. 1)
Archipelagic Southeast Asia presents perhaps the greatest geo-
graphical complexity in the world. It lies around the margins of two
continental masses. The low latitudinal position of Southeast Asia, the
broad extent of the intervening seas on its archipelagic fringes and
the deep embayment of the mainland ensure a high degree of climate uni-
formity. The continuously warm and humid condition typical of equator-
ial lowlands are experienced over a very large part of Southeast Asia.
















in a very rapid erosion and deep chemical weathering. This tropical
condition has been a major consideration in the arms transfer transactions
into this region, i.e., a special modification to adjust to the tropical
condition is necessary when producing a particular weapon to be trans-
ferred to this region.
Its geographic location is along the sea lanes between the Indian
and the Pacific Oceans and the crossroads of Asia's two high cultures,
India and China. It covers 1.2 million square miles of land and this
land is distributed among the ASEAN countries as shown in Table II. 1.









The socio-economical aspect of the ASEAN countries is much
affected by the size of the population in this region. This region
holds 5.38 percent of the world's population, and Indonesia has more
than half of that population. [3]
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The average real rate of growth of GNP in '74- '75 in this re-
gion was: Indonesia, 7.8 percent; Malaysia, 6.0 percent; Philippines,
5.8 percent; Singapore, 6.8 percent and Thailand, 4.5 percent. An im-
portant question in this region is the much debated problem of whether
growth in the Third-World "trickles down" or whether the rich get richer
and the poor get poorer. This question certainly can create socio-economic
problems in this region. Besides the problem of distribution of social
wealth, which has not yet been solved in ASEAN, another issue likely to
have an increasingly great impact on the political dynamics of those
countries is the frustation and alienation that the educated are bound to
experience as they become aware how modest the expectations are that they
can realistically entertain and how far behind the affluent countries
they will remain throughout their lifetimes.
The distributions of population and GNP per capita of the ASEAN
countries in 1978 are shown in Table II. 2 and in Figure II. 2.
Table I I. 2. The population and GNP per capita
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Histograms of the population and GNP/capita
of the ASEAN nations.
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These data indicate that in ASEAN, the size of population is
inversely proportional to the wealth/living standard of the people in
the country.
Control of population in ASEAN is becoming yery important. The
success of international, national and private efforts to create support
for population control policies, the well -publicized accomplishments of
Singapore's family planning programs have heightened awareness of popu-
lation issues.
The economic growth of four countries of ASEAN (excluding
Indonesia) comfortably exceeded the five percent growth target of annual
increases GNP set in the United Nations First Development Decade in the
sixties. Despite its miserable economic performance in the earlier
years, even Indonesia had exceeded this growth rate by 1970. All of
these countries in 1974 appeared likely to attain the 6 percent per
annum goal set in the Second Development Decade in the seventies.
Nevertheless, the maintenance of these growth rates, and their attain-
ment in other parts of the region, necessitate continued close commer-
cial and financial relations with the West and Japan. The USSR is both
unable and unwilling either to provide the enhanced capital requirements
or to absorb the greatly expanded exports that such development would
involve; China is even less capable of providing such services.
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), of
which Indonesia is a member, has won successive large price increases
in 1972 and after. The differential effects of these changes in com-
modity prices on export incomes within the region was to sharply
accentuate the existing imbalance. Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia
16

all did well in maintaining the GNP growth rate. With rocketing oil
prices, Indonesia and Malaysia (a newcomer in the ranks of oil pro-
ducers) did substantially better. For Thailand and the Philippines,
the rise in oil prices threatened to completely wipe out their foreign
exchange reserves.
Among major trading nations, it is Japan that has become of
greatest importance to ASEAN and vice versa. Japan received around 10
percent of its total imports from Southeast Asia in 1971 and in return
sent nearly 9.5 percent of its exports. If energy-short Japan wishes to
reserve for itslef a special place in ASEAN's potentially very large oil
and gas resources, some re-accomodation with the legitimate national de-
velopment goals of ASEAN countries appears essential.
Although ASEAN does not assume any real importance from the
standpoint of the direction of world trade, it nevertheless remains a
significant producer of several commodities such as tin, bauxite, iron
ore, and copper. In many products of tropical agriculture, Southeast
Asian countries hold a commanding position. ASEAN still accounts for
more than 80 percent of world exports of pepper, cassia, nutmeg, maize
and quinine. Although it produces much less rice than either South or
East Asia, Southeast Asia nevertheless generates some 40 percent of
world rice exports and it is a notable exporter of coffee, tea, sugar,
coconut oil and palm oil. More than 85 percent of natural rubber ori-
ginates from that region. [2]
The leaders of ASEAN countries have realized the necessity to
speed up the pace of industrialization. Concern for this goal re-
flects the priorities assigned to economic growth, expanded employment
17

opportunities outside agriculture, qualitative improvement in human re-
sources, trade diversification etc. Despite the priority maintained for
industrial development, progress toward this goal has remained modest
and the structures of the ASEAN economies have changed slowly, except in
Singapore. Pressures for industrialization are matched by the need to
expand food supplies to keep pace with the region's rapid population
growth.
Today, the focus of economic nationalism in the region has
shifted from the threat to the sovereignity of the host country arising
in the activities of resident aliens and foreign direct investment
enterprises to concern for excessive dependence upon Japan as a source
of imports and as a market for exports.
If the coming decade sees no substantial escalation in levels
of outside support for internal dissidence and no open warfare, the
structure of economic concerns and priorities, which have become promi-
nent in ASEAN countries, will continue to preempt the attention of the
region's political leaders and the resources at their disposal. Under
these circumstances, economic expansion in the pattern of that quarter
century will continue, a process which will support modest industriali-
zation and contraction in the shares of aggregate income generated by
agriculture and foreign trade activities. On the other hand, if past
rates of growth in per capita real income are maintained while the
pattern of income distribution remains stable, it will mean that the
modest economic growth taking place will be widely distributed and will
make a contribution to social stability.
The main problem likely to arise in the government of ASEAN countries
in this coming decade is to attempt to secure national unity that
18

transcends ethnic allegiances. Almost by definition this will be seen
to benefit certain groups at the expense of others. Current ethnic
composition of the ASEAN nations are:
a. Indonesia
Traditionally, non-Javanese such as Balinese, Bataks,
Menadonese, Minangese etc. have felt left out of Indonesian's political
and economical system. Although Indonesia's prime ministers (unlike
Malaysia's) have come from a variety of ethnic groups, the Army officer
corps reportedly has become increasingly dominated by Javanese since
the ascendancy of the military following the 1965 coup and counter-coup
which toppled Soekarno. One of the ways the Army expanded its economic
role was by restricting Chinese-owned business (Chinese are about 2.9
percent of population). Nonetheless, non-Javanese might not pose the
greatest difficulties for the ruling regime. Some of the potentially
most troublesome problems with which the military regime will have to
cope involve factional splits among Javanese Army officers themeselves.
b. Malaysia
Since independence the dominant political force in Malaysia
has been the National Front, formerly known as the Alliance Party.
Originally a coalition of UMNO (United Malays National Organization),
which was primarily Malay; MCA (Malaysia Chinese Association), which
was primarily Chinese; and the less powerful MIC (Malaysian Indian Cong-
ress), which was primarily Indian. S-ince 1969, Malay domination in this
coalition has grown. The civil service, particularly at top ranks, is
heavily staffed by Malays, although Chinese and Indians can be found in
technical services. The police and the army are largely Malays, although
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Chinese and Indians can be found in technical services. The police and
the army are largely Malays, although the air force, which has many
Chinese pilots, is less so. Certain cabinet portfolios are tradi-
tionally held by non Malays. The Minister of Housing, for example is
Chinese and the Minister of Telecommunication is Indian, whereas the
Ministries of Interior, Defense and Foreign Affairs are always controlled
by Malays. A significant number of Malay ascendancies since 1969 have
been reflected in the awarding of the Finance Ministry portfolio, which
for 20 years had been in Chinese hands, to a Malay. Perhaps the most
important implication of these trends for the future is that the growing
Malay political dominance will give Malays increasing influence over the
national economy.
c. Philippines
The regime of Marcos is not easily ethnically labelled as
other governments in the region, except perhaps negatively, i.e., not
Muslim and not Chinese, and it is probably not controlled chiefly by
non-Luzon groups. Since the traditional support of Filipino politi-
cians has been local ist, observers have been noting to what extent
Ilocanos (the Luzon linguistic group from which Marcos comes) have bene-
fited from martial law, particularly from the expanding role of the
military. Regarding the Chinese minority, the Marcos government has
stepped up pressure on the Chinese to declare Philippines citizenship.
Many local Chinese already have been assimilated and intermarriage be-
tween Chinese and Filipinos is common. Land-reform, ironically, has
widened the economic gaps between well -developed regions, such as
Central Luzon, and poorer regions, such as eastern Visayas. The most
20

disaffected ethnic minority is the Muslim community in the Southern
islands of Mindanao and Sulu.
d. Singapore
Although Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's People's Action Party
(PAP) is virtually a Chinese party in a society that is 75 percent
ethnic Chinese, the government has been very conscious of both the
"Malay Sea" surrounding the city state of Singapore and the vulnerability
to regional disturbances of the finance and processing based economy. In
particular, Singapore's Chinese leadership is sensitive to the concern of
the Malaysian government for its ethnic brethren in Singapore. Thus Lee
has taken other steps to soften the resistance of the minority Malays.
On the other hand, there have been recent reports that the government
has "excused" Malays from military service. Persistent Malay-Chinese
distrust has blocked cooperation between the regimes of Malaysia and
Singapore.
e. Thailand
The politics of Thailand, both civilian and military, are
controlled by ethnic Thais, who comprise 67 percent of the population.
Of the minorities, the Chinese are commercially preeminent, often pro-
viding Thai politicians with lucrative business opportunities in ex-
change for government tolerance. Minorities in the North and Northeast
are hill peoples traditionally ignored by the lowland majority. Thai
Meo people have become the focus of anxiety on the part of the central
government, because of their alleged alliance with communist dissidents
along the strategic border areas.
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In the South the most visible ethnic minority has been the
Malay Muslims residing along the Malaysian border. Officers and police
governing the province, where the Malays are prevalent, are ethnic
Thai. [4]
4. Political
From the description in the previous sections, the social prob-
lems, i.e., ethnic disputes, in ASEAN might turn out to be the primary
political problems among the governments in the region. To a great ex-
tent the normalization of politics among the nations on mainland South-
east Asia will depend upon finding ways to resolve ethnic problems among
common borders. It is most unlikely that resolution through police
operations alone will bring peace. Although ASEAN potentially could
serve as a vehicle for solving ethnic disputes which have grown into dis-
putes among states in the region, it will probably be unable to do so until
a reduction in current conflicts enables it to develop into a truly co-
operative body. The evolution will be difficult for several reasons:
a. ASEAN' s membership is too limited to be able to represent
the Southeast Asia region, since it does not include Laos, Vietnam,
Cambodia, Burma, Brunei and Papua New Guinea.
b. ASEAN' s member nations do not especially trust each other
and have differences in achieving the objectives of ASEAN.
c. ASEAN' s present members are rather careful of rushing too
quickly into burdening the organization with more functions than it can
handle.
Some interesting developments of relationships between ASEAN
countries and external powers such as the US, Soviet-Union, China, Japan,
22

Vietnam etc. are briefly described below to enhance the knowledge of the
political situation in this region.
After years of taking US interest in Southeast Asia for granted,
ASEAN countries tend to take disinterest for granted. After years of
being overly concerned, the US tends to be under concerned. Neverthe-
less, with some Indonesian efforts to lobby for US understanding, the US
is now upgrading the level and intensity of ASEAN-US contacts. Among
the main worries of the ASEAN countries toward the US are that the US
should resist internal protectionist sentiment, maintain bases in Philip-
pines, sustain US-Japan alliance, and seek to influence the Indochinese
situation. US stresses on political human rights create irritation and
resentment among ASEAN countries. Much more sustained and thoughtful
effort is required on both sides in order to promote and enhance mutual
interests.
While ASEAN diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union began
developing first, China has made more headway in the past few years, both
diplomatically and in trade. ASEAN nations are disinclined to support
the Soviet concept of collective security against threats that ASEAN does
not perceive. The Soviets are disinclined to support the ASEAN concept
of a neutral zone which aims at preventing any one power from becoming a
threat. Yet, the Soviets have criticized ASEAN as a US-backed military
alliance. This relationship is uncertain but may be improving. The way
the Soviets play their hand with Hanoi in relation to China, Laos and




Sino-ASEAN relations are additionally complicated by varying
degrees of overseas-Chinese assimilation on one hand and varying de-
grees of attraction exercised by Chinese on the other. The fact that
China insists upon party-to-party relations co-existing with state-to-
state relations makes the ASEAN countries worry about Maoist insurgen-
cies. Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines have established diplo-
matic relationships with China, but Indonesia, because of the abortive
coup by the Indonesian Communist Party backed by China in 1965, is still
reluctant to do so. Singapore, which is politically dependent upon
Indonesia, waits to be the last one to establish diplomatic relationship
with China.
Japan's economic drive in Southeast Asia persists while its US
and EEC competitors are more spasmodic in their ASEAN efforts. Too much
Japanese stress on bilateral relations will foster suspicions of "divide
and rule". Japan will be slow to subtly encourage ASEAN economic unity
which is the only way out of its dilemma.
Vietnam stresses "genuine independence" as it pursues improved
ASEAN ties, but ASEAN countries continue to wonder how genuine Vietnam's
independence is in relation to the Soviet Union, especially now that
Vietnam is a member of CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance).
Grave ASEAN doubts exist about Vietnamese intentions for Laos and
Cambodia to have genuine independence. Vietnam promises to abstain from
party-to-party relations with ASEAN communist parties will have to be
matched by performance. If the US does normalize relations with Vietnam
in the near future, it might be a good prospect for continued progress
toward better state-to-state relations, plus increasing trade between
24

Vietnam and ASEAN. If the US does not, and Vietnam-Soviet ties move
appreciably closer, then relations are likely to remain cool and cor-
rect but not close.
While relationships with external powers find the ASEAN countries
nearly united, the internal relationships found among them reflect more
of the differences rather than the similarities among the ASEAN nations.
Many Malaysian Malays see Indonesia as their big Malay-Muslim
brother, while the present government of Indonesia sticks staunchly by
the principles of the secular state. Indonesia worries about Malaysia's
inter-racial and security problems. Malaysia perceives that there will
be blood-brother help in a major crisis. When Malaysians start talking
about what is best for Southeast Asia, or make other self-centered re-
sponses, discord is implicit. There is nothing to worry about yet, but
it would help more if Malay leaders had a shrewder appreciation of Indo-
nesian political realities.
In Singaporean eyes, Indonesia is politically huge and Singapore
small, while in Indonesian eyes, Singapore is economically strong and
Indonesia weak. Singaporean perceptions and underlying insecurity have
prompted it to a major role in Indonesia's economy which compounds
Indonesian feelings of insecurity vis-a-vis Singapore. Singapore has
continued to assert itself occasionally in ways that slight Indonesian
nationalism. Overall Indonesian economic weakness sustains Singapore
in holding back the formalization of diplomatic rations with China until
Indonesia unfreezes its Peking ties. This indicates the Singaporean
appreciation of the Indonesian political realities.
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The Philippines had promised to dissolve their legal dream of
claiming Sabah to reduce Malaysian resentment, but the Philippines in-
ability to meaningfully integrate its Muslim minority within the Philip-
pines polity will extend the rebellion and create more problems and
irritation for Malaysia beside the claim. (The Philippines claimed
Sabah as its territory, based on a disputed document of lease contract,
made in 1878, between Sultan Sulu and a representative of a British firm.
The British, and subsequently the Malaysian government, claimed that
title to the land was leased by the Sultan and his heirs in perpetuity,
while the Philippines held that the land was only leased on the basis of
payment of annual rental.) (J03
Malaysia and Singapore joined together in haste in 1963 and
parted amid politico-communal bitterness in 1965. Both countries were
unable to sustain the pre-independence reality of being two political
units but one economic unit. Singapore's Chinese majority and Malay
minority were back-to-back with Malaysia's Malay majority and Chinese
minority. Malaysia and Singapore share a common threat, the Malayan
Communist Party, but also a querulous partnership. They have yet to
show a greatly improved capacity to anticipate problems and resolve them
to mutual advantage.
The main problems of Thailand and Malaysia are the Thai-
Malaysia border area, the MCP (Malayan Communist Party) around the
border and the Thai-Muslim minority that has its dream of separatism.
There is a poor degree of Thai administrative control in the south,
which is tantamount to tolerance of MCP remnants and this is often a
stimulus to seccessionism among Muslims. Due to the restoration of
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Thai -Malaysian cooperation and joint operations against the MCP follow-
ing the hiatus of 1975, seccessionism is not a very real current threat
to Thailand and MCP is a somewhat lessening threat to Malaysian security,
There are no significant problems in the relationships between
Indonesia-Philippines, Indonesia-Thailand, Philippines-Thailand,
Philippines-Singapore, or Singapore-Thailand. [5^
5. Military
The military is a dominant factor in the political atmosphere in
ASEAN countries. Three of the members, Indonesia, Thailand and the
Philippines, have a strong military role in their administrations. But
the percentage of armed forces in these three countries are relatively
smaller than in Singapore and Malaysia. The Philippines and Indonesia
used to have less than 3 percent and Thailand has never been above 5.5
percent of the population for their armed forces. Indonesia has shown
a declining number of armed forces since 1970. Figures II. 3 and 1 1.
4
are plots of the population of armed forces and the military expendi-
tures for the five countries in 1968-1977. Some jumps and drops or
increasing and decreasing on the plots shows the military situation and
atmospheres within ASEAN countries during specific years, e.g., Indo-
china war, East Timor dispute etc. Some more explanations will be
given and discussed in the next chapters. Table 1 1. 3 exhibits the
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FIGURE II.
3
The plots of populations of armed forces (PAF)
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FIGURE II.
4
The plots of military expenditures (ME)
data 1967-1975 of the ASEAN countries.
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Table II. 3. The military power of the ASEAN nations, 1978-1979,
Country IND. MAL. PHIL. SING. THAI.
Armed Forces 247K 64. 5K 99K 36K 212K
MILEX $1.6B $699M $793M $41 OM $746M
Army 180K 52.5K 63K 30K 141K
Navy 39K 6K 20K 3K 28K
Air Force 28K 6K 16K 3K 43K
Reserve (112K) (240K) (185K) (82. 5K) (566K)
Combat Ships 98 42 77 22 87
Combat A/C 45 36 111 103 149
Tanks 485 400 395 375 453
(K = 10 3 ; Nl = 10
6
; B = 10
9
) [6]
Almost in all aspects, except in reserve and combat aircraft,
Indonesia has the biggest number among the ASEAN countries. As the
most populated country in this area, Indonesia is a candidate for the
hegemonic role in the Southeast Asia region, in which Vietnam is a
strong candidate, too. But, to catch up with what Vietnam has after
the Vietnam war, to balance the power between communists and non-
communists in this region, Indonesia and the other ASEAN nations have
to carefully and intensively build-up their military strength. Table
1 1. 3 above also indicated that Thailand is the second in the military
power ranks in the ASEAN. Its reserve and combat aircraft are far
above Indonesia's and the other ASEAN nations. As the closest
frontier to the communist countries among the other ASEAN nations,
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Thailand has to have enough military power to confront and to avoid the
possible expansion of the communists. Singapore has 103 combat air-
craft, compared to only 45 combat aircraft that Indonesia has. It
showed the efforts of Singapore to build up its military power, smartly
considering the manpower efficiency. Recent development in Indonesian
DOD have required the build-up of the air force, by purchasing more
sophisticated combat aircraft. This is a possible response to the situ-
ation that is shown in Table II. 3.
B. ARMS TRANSFER
The words arms transfer indicate the flows of arms, or weapons
hardware, from one nation to another nation. It can be given as grant
aid from a stronger nation to its allies or purchased from one by
another. This section will review the area of arms transfer in general
and in the ASEAN countries specifically.
1 . In General
Recently the transfer of military hardware has come into vogue
as one way of viewing and measuring international relationships. Some
work has been done to derive qualitative measurements of military hard-
ware that has been transferred (by aid or by sale) and to utilize these
measurements in making qualitative statement about transfers and about
changing military relationships.
The data on the actual military hardware that has been trans-
ferred internationally, though sometimes this was not the "real" data,




a. Data on the transfer of major combat and transport aircraft
and heavy helicopters are available and generally good, in the sense
that the types and numbers are usually known.
b. Data on the acquisition of other aircraft are less complete
(i.e., trainers, light transports liaison aircraft, light helicopters
etc. )
.
c. Data on the acquisition of naval vessels are very good in
terms of when and whether a particular type has been acquired but not
good as to exact numbers.
d. Data on acquisitions of missiles are good in terms of when
and whether a particular type has been acquired but not good as to
numbers.
e. Data on transfers of armor are of yery uneven quality, par-
ticularly armor acquired as military assistance rather than sales.
f. Data on acquisition of artillery, crew-served weapons,
small arms, and essential ancillary equipment such as radar, electronic
control equipment and the like are exceedingly spotty.
g. The quality of available data discussed above is not a
function of which country originated the transfer, i.e., the donor or
sales source.
The recent upsurge in the quantity and quality of arms trans-
fers is of increasing concern to policy makers and policy analysts.
Their concern focuses on a series of critical questions which can not
be answered without valid and reliable arms transfer data. Those
questions can be described as:




- What are they contracting for, in terms of numbers, types,
mode of delivery and financial arrangement?
- What are the delivery patterns, number and types?
- What is the monetary value of these transfers?
- What is the military capability of the recipient country
before and after a specific arms transfer?
Since this paper relates more to the flows into a particular
region, i.e., ASEAN countries, some questions related to the impact on
recipient countries can be added:
- How do certain types and levels of arms transfers affect local
military balances?
- Do arms transfer enhance or inhibit the internal stability of
recipient countries?
- What effects do arms transfers have on the economic develop-
ment of recipient countries?
To be able to answer these questions, one must first obtain
valid and reliable data on arms transfers. Some reliable sources of
the required Arms Transfers Data Sets are:
- SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute),
which has World Armaments & Disarmaments SIPRI Yearbook and The Arms
Trade Registers.
- ACDA (US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), which has
World Military Expenditures & Arms Transfers data, available yearly
for ten years (1967-1976).
- IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies), which
has The Military Balance, annually.
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- CIS (Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology), which has "Arms Transfer to Less Development Countries".
- Department of Defense (DOD) publication, Military Assistance
and Sales Facts.
- Other sources such as Aviation Week and International Defense
Review. ["8]
2. Arms Transfers Within ASEAN Countries
The flows of arms transfers to the ASEAN countries are increas-
ing from year to year. This is shown in Figure II. 5. a and b which con-
sists of plots of arms imports data of five ASEAN countries for 1968-
1977, in 1976 dollars.
As indicated in the previous section, most of the flows of this
arms transfer to ASEAN countries came from Western countries, since all
five countries are non-communist countries.
The fluctuations of the arms transfers in a particular country
such as Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore, which can be seen in Figure
II. 5a and b, explains a lot about the arms transfer behavior related to
the changes of the security situation in this region. Major effects to
be noted are the strong involvement of the US in the Indochina war,
which ended with the downfall of South-Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to
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FIGURE II. 5a
The plots of arms imports (AI)














The plots of arms imports (AI)
data 1967-1975 of the ASEAN countries
(country data are plotted separately due to

III. THE MODELS
As indicated in the title of this thesis, the model which is to
be used in this analysis is an econometric model. The forecasting
model, which is derived from the econometric model, is useful for pre-




Two classes of econometric models may be distinguished, single equa-
tion and simultaneous equations models. The single equation models con-
sist of one or a series of regression equations in which individual
equations are unrelated to each other. The equations are estimated by
the method of ordinary least squares (OLS). The simultaneous equations
models, however, express casual relationships among the various equa-
tions and the endogenous variables in the models. The relationships are
determined simultaneously with the solution of the entire system. All
econometric models contain variables, which are either endogenous or
exogenous, and parameters in a system of structural equations. The
endogenous variables are those variables the values for which are simul-
taneously determined by the model and which the model is designed to ex-
plain. The exogenous variables are variables the values for which are
determined outside the model but which influence the model. The error
terms are random variables that typically are added to all equations of
the model. The explicit parameters of the model are the constant co-
efficients that multiply the variables of the model.
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For the arms transfer model there are two significant variables,
military expenditures and arms imports, which are to be estimated.
1 . Structure of the Single Equation Model





where: Y-. = the i-th endogenous variable in period t
X it
= the j-th exogenous variable in period t
u. = the error term in period t































= military expenditure in period t
AI . = arms imports in period t
GNP. = gross national product in period t
CGE. = central government expenditure in period t
TI. = total imports in period t
PAF. = population of armed forces in period t
a. Military Expenditure Model
In this model, the changes in the dependent variable, mili-
tary expenditure is affected by the changes of the independent variables,
i.e., arms imports, gross national product, central government expendi-
ture, population of armed forces and the error term, u.
b. Arms Import Model
Here, changes in arms imports, the dependent variable, are
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affected by changes of the independent variables, i.e., military expendi-
ture, gross national product, total imports, percentage of armed forces
and the error term, u.
2. Structure of Simultaneous Equations Model




<V xkr u t>
where: Y-. = the i-th endogenous variable in period t
Y-. = the j-th endogenous variable in period t
X.
t
= the k-th exogenous variable in period t
u
t
= error term in period t







where: B is a nonsingular GxG matrix of coefficients of the endo-
genous variables.
Y. is a vector of G endogenous variables in period t
C is a GxK matrix of coefficients of the exogenous variables
X. is a vector of K exogenous variables in period t
u. is a vector of G random error terms in period t, assumed
to have zero means and a constant variance s
The addition of Y as an explanatory variable is the essence
of simultaneity. Endogenous variables, such as variable j, are used to
explain other endogenous variables such as i. Thus the analysis is




The simultaneous equations for this arms transfers model
exhibit the very close relationship between the endogenous variables ME
and AI. Military expenditures are a constraint for arms imports, e.g.,
arms imports cannot exceed some proportion of military expenditures in
a particular year. On the other hand, the amount of military expendi-
tures in a particular year will be affected by the amount of arms im-
ports in this particular year. For this arms transfer model, the simul-

























or, it can be written as:
bll. ME + b!2.AI + cll.GNP + C12.PAF + cl3.CGE = ul
D21.ME + bl2.AI + C21.GNP + C22.PAF + c24.TI = u2
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Since the model above used simultaneous equations, it may
happen that two or more equations consisting of the same variables can-
not be distinguished from each other. This kind of problem is called
the problem of identification.
A necessary condition for identifying any one of the equa-
tions in a simultaneous equation model is that ewery other equation in
the system must contain at least one variable which is missing from the
equation.
Let G be the total number of exogenous variables in the simul-
taneous equation system, K be the total number of exogenous or predeter-
mined variables in the simultaneous equation system, g, be the number of
endogenous variables, and k-j be the number of exogenous variables in one
of the equations. Also, let g2 be the number of endogenous variables and
k2 be the number of exogenous variables not included in that equation.
Thus:
g2
= G - g-j and k
2
= K - k^
The equation is exactly identified if g? + k? = G
- 1 which
means that the total number of variables excluded from the equation must
equal the total number of endogenous variables in the simultaneous equa-
tion system less one.
If <£ + k.9 < G - 1, the equation is underidentified, and if
g« + k 2 > G





= 2 (ME and AI) ===> g 2 =G-g-, =
k
1
= 3 (GNP, CGE and PAF) ===> k
2









that is the first equation is exactly identified.
Second equation (arms imports):
g 2 (ME and AI) ===> g2





= 3 (GNP.TI and PAF) ===> k
2







Thus, the second equation is also exactly identified. So
far the necessary condition is satisfied. £llJ The identification
problem requires both necessary and sufficient conditions.
As defined above, A is a Gx(G+K) matrix of all coefficients
in the system and the rows are:
Al = (bll bl2 ell cl2 cl3 cl4)
A2 = (b21 b22 c21 c22 c23 c24)
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Then the sufficient or rank condition for identification for
this system is /°(A.Q) = G - 1 where /°(A.Q) refers to the rank of the
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) = G - 1 = 1, that
satisfies the sufficient conditions for both first and second equations
in the model. Since both necessary and sufficient conditions are satis-
fied, the equations in the arms transfers model are identified.
3. Sample and Data Collection
In modelling the arms transfer to the ASEAN countries (Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), the data for military
expenditure (ME), arms imports (AI), gross national products (GNP),
central government expenditures (CGE), population of the armed forces
(PAF) and total imports (TI) are available for ten years in WORLD MILI-
TARY EXPENDITURES AND ARMS TRANSFERS 1967-1976, where the data set with
1975 constant dollars has been picked for this analysis.
All the data except population of the armed forces are obtained
in terms of local currencies. Approximate compensation for the effects
of inflation was made by "deflating" the current local currency values
to constant 1975 local currency values and then converting to 1975 US
dollar equivalents.
The military expenditures data are the expenditures of the
Ministry of Defense of each country.
The gross national product data represent the total output of
goods and services produced by residents of each country and valued at
the market prices ultimately paid by consumers. The source of the GNP
data was the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
The central government expenditures data include current and
capital (developmental) expenditures plus net lending (gross government
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lending minus repayments of past loans) but excludes the purchase of
equities. The source of the data was US Statistical Yearbook 1976,
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) Economic
Surveys and individual country's Yearbook.
The population of Armed Forces refer to the active duty military
personnel, including paramilitary forces where those forces resemble
regular units in their organization, equipment, training or mission.
The arms imports data represent the international transfer under
grant, credit or cash sale terms of military equipment, usually referred
to as "conventional", including weapons of war, parts, ammunition, sup-
port equipment and other commodities considered primarily military in
nature. Acquisition by a nation of some given quantity of armaments
does not necessarily impose that burden on its economy; therefore, eco-
nomic value of arms imports should not be related in detail to the local
economies.
Total imports data cover both goods and services. These data
come from the UN System of National Accounts as published in Interna-
tional Financial Statistics by International Monetary Fund.
All the data of each of the variables ME, AI, GNP, CGE, TI and
PAF were pooled in eleven years for five countries and stored in a
55x6 matrix, as shown in Table 111,1 . [9]
4. Test of Pooling, Heteroscedasticity and Existence of Serial -
Correlation
The available data must be tested to determine whether they can
be pooled, whether there exists some heteroscedasticity, and whether
there is any autocorrelation among the variables in applying the single
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TABLE III.l. The data set of the econometric model of the arms
transfers to the ASEAN countries (1967-1977).
(PAF in millions people, others in millions $)
Country ME AI PAF GNP CGE TI
IND 491 3 0.367 19031 1807 1090
639 8 0.347 20941 1873 1156
720 15 0.358 22393 2147 1200
787 29 0.357 24082 2711 1462
888 28 0.358 25658 3580 1530
940 27 0.356 27406 4357 2084
872 25 0.309 30249 5285 3449
916 46 0.27 31942 6061 4433
1287 32 0.261 33794 7381 5025
1260 80 0.257 36294 8557 5670
1311 57 0.259 38653 8917 5905
MAL 205 14 0.042 5779 1656 1858
200 16 0.046 6311 1633 1873
190 31 0.046 6533 1402 1814
221 7 0.058 6856 1603 2061
237 42 0.062 7299 2010 2002
409 40 0.069 8018 2483 2190
357 51 0.07 8868 2204 3159
416 35 0.075 9533 2623 4784
477 53 0.076 9685 3052 3744
440 40 0.08 10547 3096 3828
474 57 0.079 11396 3785 4310
PHIL 113 40 0.045 10213 1120 1977
120 32 0.051 11037 1146 2067
127 31 0.055 11625 1447 1921
133 15 0.059 12126 1408 1769
140 28 0.058 12826 1274 1850
198 40 0.062 13457 1957 1830
249 25 0.063 14755 2131 2236
305 35 0.09 15690 1839 4004
515 42 0.12 16616 2644 3942
553 60 0.14 17734 2773 3938
•
597 57 0.155 18814 3019 4045
SING 54 0.01 2588 450 2364
77 0.011 2762 452 2050
187 15 0.012 3130 481 3136
309 29 0.014 3535 634 3596
308 28 0.015 3932 843 3949
319 80 0.02 4423 933 4541
325 63 0.024 4802 1117 6507
329 35 0.024 5516 1068 9674
324 21 0.028 5451 1305 8565
381 20 0.035 5782 1372 9070
401 28 0.036 6221 1431 9925
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TABLE III. 7 (Continued)
Country ME AI PAF GNP CGE TI
THAI 131 94 0.152 8794 1492 1490
148 113 0.167 9324 1761 1873
185 77 0.175 10056 1808 1921
224 44 0.175 10735 1961 1900
299 56 0.195 11574 2277 1794
311 40 0.205 12048 2224 1977
292 126 0.233 13280 2136 2590
319 46 0.221 14030 1892 3625
380 42 0.227 15057 2359 3455
478 80 0.228 16245 2801 3572
615 47 0.23 17227 3148 4375
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equation model. Therefore, the three tests which must be completed prior
to solving the problem are
a. The Chow test for pooling
In this test, two alternatives were used:
- each two years observation for all countries.
- the whole observations, i.e., pooled sample.
Therefore, there were five tests in each single equation or
ten test results for both ME and AI.
The procedures for testing both samples are:
(1) Calculate sum of squared errors on both samples: ESS1
for the first sample and ESS2 for the second sample, as the outcomes of
the single equations, using the ordinary least square (OLS).
(2) Calculate the value of
(ESS2-ESSl)/(N+T-2)
F = - —
(ESS1)/(NT-N-T)
(3) Get the F (a,b) using F-distribution table.
Where a is (N+T-2) and b is (NT-N-T).
(4) The null hypothesis that the sample size can be pooled
can be accepted if the F-value in 2 < F (a,b).
The result for the military expenditures and arms im-
ports data turned out to be:
- ME equation:
(a) ESS of five two years observations were:
89331.75/80494.19/147188.04/120839.15/116455.08




(c) F (5,40), with .026 significancelevel = 2.90
(d) F-values yield from (a) and (b) were:
.934/1. 051/. 518/. 658/. 688
(e) Since all F-values in (d) were less than 2.90, so
the null hypothesis can be accepted for all groups.
There is therefore no problem in pooling the data for
the military expenditure equation.
- AI equation:
(a) ESS of five two years observations were:
4082.07/1865.15/1650.24/2017.38/1595.54
(b) ESS of pooled sample were:
27418.06
(c) F (5,40), with .025 significancelevel = 2.90
(d) F-values yield from (a) and (b) were:
.715/1.713/1.952/1.574/2.023
(e) Since all F-values in (d) less than F (5,40) = 2.90,
the null hypothesis can be accepted. In other words, there is no problem
in pooling for the arms imports equation.
With the results on the Chow test on both single equa-
tions ME and AI above, there is no problem in pooling the data, i.e.,
pooling of the data is feasible so the analysis may proceed to the next
step in estimation.
b. The Goldfelt-Quandt Test for Heteroscedasticity
This test involves the calculation of two least-squares re-
gression lines, one using data thought to be associated with low variance
errors and the other using data thought to be associated with high
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variance errors. If the residual variances associated each regression
line are approximately equal, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity
cannot be rejected. On the contrary, if residual variances increase
substantially, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity can be rejected.
The Goldfelt-Quandt test can be carried out as follows:
(1) Order the data by the magnitude of the independent
causative variable X, which is thought to be related to the error var-
iance.
(2) Omit the middle "d" observations where "d" is to be
approximately one-fifth of the total sample in this case. In general,
"d" is selected based upon considerations of power.
(3) Fit two separate regressions, the first for the low
values of X and the second for the high values of X.
(4) Calculate the residual sum of squares associated with
each regression, ESS1 associated with low X's and ESS2 associated with
high X's.
(5) Assuming that the error process is normally distributed
and no serial correlation is present, the statistic ESS2/ESS1 will be
distributed as an F statistic with (N-d-4)/2 degrees of freedom in both
numerator and denumerator.
(6) The null hypothesis of homoscedasticity can be accepted
if ESS2/ESS1 is less than the critical value of the F distribution with
(N-d-4)/2 on both numerator and denumerator.
Applying this procedure to the ME (military expenditures)
with causative variables GNP, C6E, PAF and to the AI (arms imports) with
causative variables GNP, TI, PAF using APL programs yield:
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ME/GNP ===> (ESS2/ESS1) = 1.322
ME/PAF ===> (ESS1/ESS1) = .394
ME/CGE ===> (ESS2/ESS1) = 1.233
AI/GNP ===> (ESS2/ESS1) = 2.126
AI/PAF ===> (ESS2/ESS1) = .704
AI/TI ===> (ESS2/ESS1) = .706
F (18,18) with significance level .05 = 2.33
Since the values of (ESS2/ESS1) are less than the critical
value of F (18,18) distribution with significance level .05, the
hypothesis that the error terms are homoscedastic can be accepted,
c. The Durbin-Watson test for serial correlation
Consider a test of the null hypothesis that no serial cor-
relation is present (/° = 0). This test involves the calculation of a
statistic based on the residuals from the ordinary least squares re-









The Durbin Watson statistic will lie in the range (0,4), in
which values near two indicate no first order serial correlation. Exact
interpretation of the DW statistic is difficult because the sequence of
error terms depends not only on the sequence of e's, but also on the
sequence of all X values. Two limits are given, labelled dl_ for lower
limit and dU for upper limit.
The range of the Durbin Watson statistics can be figured as
shown in Table III. 2.
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Table III. 2. The range of Durbin-Watson statistics.
(4-dL) < DW < 4 Reject Ho (negative serial correl.)
(d-dll) < DW < (4-dL) Indeterminate result
2 < DW < (4-dU) Accept Ho
dU < DW < 2 Accept Ho
dL < DW < du* Indeterminate result
< DW_<_dL__ _Reject_Ho_ (^posi ti ve^seri al _correl ^
)
The result of running regressions using OLS (ordinary least squares)
for each individual country in ten years observations for the Durbin-
Watson statistic are shown in Table III. 3.
Table III. 3. The Durbin-Watson statistics of the OLS
to the individual ASEAN countries.
~~2ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ?EZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ?IZZZZZZZ
Indonesia DW = 1.7281 DW = 2.1845
Malaysia DW = 2.2866 DW = 2.9486
Philippines DW = 1.9834 DW = 2.2992
Singapore DW = 1.2560 DW = 1.6480
Thailand QW.f.^3798 DW.=. 2^0718
The plots of residuals for both equations for each country showed that
there was no serial correlation behavior in this estimation. These are
shown in Figures III.l and III. 2.
With the above results, it can be determined that there is no serial
correlation present in the error terms.
5. Results of Final Estimation for Single Equation Model
Using the OLS program in TSP (Time Series Processor) to estimate
the single equation model for military expenditures and arms imports for
each individual country in ten years observations yields the results which
are shown in Table III. 4 and Table III. 5. The results will be discussed
more fully in Chapter IV.
6. Results of Estimation for Simultaneous Equation Model
The FIML (full information maximum likelihood) program in TSP
(time series processor) was used to estimate the simultaneous equations
model for military expenditure and arms imports. The empirical results
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Table 1 1 1. 4. The results of OLS on military expenditures
of the individual ASEAN countries.






















































































(SSR = 16443.4 SER = 57.347 DW stat = 1.256)
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Table III. 4 (Continued)
























(SSR = 1019.,43 SER = 14. 279 DW stat := 2.3798)
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Table III. 5. The results of OLS on arms imports
of the individual ASEAN countries.














(SSR = 1076i.77 SER = 14.675 DW stat = 2.1845)











(SSR = 507. 837 SER = 10.078 DW stat = 2.2992)

























(SSR = 2496. 15 SER = 22.34 DW stat = 1.648)
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Table III. 5 (Continued)






















(SSR = 6382..79 SER = 35.73 DW stat = 2.0718)
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Table III. 6. The results of the simultaneous equation model







a (O -996.13 227.52 -4.38
a^GNP) .01 .02 .5
a
2
(CGE) .019 .01 1.83
a
3
(PAF) -133.76 148.67 -.9
a
4
(AI) 31.84 1.17 27.16
b (C) 29.2 6.85 4.27
b^ME) -.02 .021 -1.11
b
2
(TI) .002 .009 2.2
b
3
(PAF) 6.07 4.54 1.34
b
4
(GNP) .001 .001 .84
(ME: SSR = 319204 SER = 799.004 DW stat = 1.3886)




The econometric model which is explored above, is concerned more
with the structure of the model, based upon the historical data of two
endogenous variables, military expenditures and arms imports, and four
exogenous variables, gross national product, central government expends
tures, total imports and population of armed forces, in nine years and
five countries observations.
This section will explore the forecasting model, which will adjust
the structural model to give a better result, closer to the expected
estimation.
A forecast is a quantitative estimate about future events based on
past and current informations. By extrapolating the models out beyond
the period over which they were estimated, the information contained in
them can be used to make forecasts about future events. The prediction
problem here is to obtain estimates or guesses as to the movement of
military expenditures and arms imports variables, given additional in-
formation about the movement of lags of gross national product, central
government expenditures, total imports and population of armed forces,
i.e., lagged variables LGNP, LCGE, LTI and LPAF.
Next, unconditional ex-post forecasts, unconditional ex-ante and
conditional ex-ante forecasts will be discussed. The ex-post fore-
cast applies when the forecast period is such that the observations on
both endogenous variables are known with certainty. The ex-ante fore-
cast predicts values of the dependent variable beyond the estimation
period using explanatory variables which may or may not be known with
certainty, depending on the nature of the data and the length of the
lags associated with the explanatory variables. In the unconditional
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forecast, values for all the explanatory variables in the forecasting
equation are known with certainty. In the conditional forecast, values
for one or more explanatory variables are not known with certainty, so
that forecast for them must be used to produce the forecast of the de-
pendent variable.
The result generated from the ex-post forecast can be checked against
the existing data, providing a means of evaluating the forecast model.
The ex-ante/unconditional forecast, uses the current (1977) values of ME
and AI and lags (1976) values of ME. AI, GNP, CGE, TI, PAF to get the
forecast values of ME and AI for the current year (1977).
1
.
Structure of the Model
The structure of the model is not far from the simultaneous equa-
tions model described in the previous section A modification using the
lagged variables is needed to obtain both ex-post and ex-ante forecasts.
The military expenditure and arms imports equations were simul-
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Figure III. 3 is the block diagram of the forecasting model.
Nine years observations for both lagged (1967-1975) and current
(1968-1976) variables will be applied to this forecasting model. The
data in 1977 is kept out for testing the accuracy of the model, es-
pecially for the ex-ante forecast.
2. Forecasting Accuracy Test
Various errors must be taken into account in any study of the





















The block diagram of
the arms transfers forecasting model
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- Inaccuracy in the model related to simplification of reality
and hence the model may omit certain influences and simplify others.
- Inaccuracy of the data used in the estimation of the model.
- Inaccuracy or bias present in the method of estimation, to
which must be added possible errors of computation (round-off error).
- Errors in the forecasts of exogenous variables and in the
constant factors.
- Inaccuracies in the "actual" data to which the forecast is to
be compared.






































A convenient way of showing geometrically the accuracy of fore-
casts in the case of the forecast of a single variable is given in
Figure I I I. 4.
In this figure, the 45 degree line is the line of perfect fore-
casts, for which the actual and forecasted percentage changes are equal.
Quadrant I contains points for which an increase was forecasted and for
which an increase actually occurred. Quadrant III contains points for
































occurred. Quadrant II contains turning point errors for which an in-
crease was forecasted but the variable actually decreased. Quadrant IV
contains turning point errors, for which a decrease was forecasted but
the variable actually increased.
The actual percentage change, shown on the horizontal axis is:
A = (-$-™fci) x 100
Z Y
t-1






F = (.5 5=1) x 100
t YT
t-1
An algebraic measure of the overall accuracy of several fore-
casts is the inequality coefficient. If F. and A. are forecast and
actual percent changes respectively, for period i, ranging from 1 to








Here the numerator is the root mean square error in the fore-
cast, while the denominator is the root mean square error assuming zero
forecasted change. The case of perfect forecasts is that which U. = 0.
If F. = 0, so the forecasted percent change were zero, meaning a status
quo forecast for all variables in question, then U = 1 . The case of
64

U. = 1 is therefore equivalent to a status quo forecast. U. can exceed
unit, in which case the forecasts are worse than the status quo forecast. [8]
3. Empirical Results
Applying the data, in which the AI data for Singapore in 1967 and
1968 were changed to nonzero numbers to avoid overflow in the program
processing, and using the same procedure as in the simultaneous econometric
model, with the FIML program in the TSP, the results are shown in Table
III. 7.
Table III. 7. The empirical results of the forecasting model









(C) 25.6861 25 .0593 .985679
a^LME) .8811 .0931 9.4601
a
2
(LAI) -.2558 .445 -.57484
a
3
(GNP) .0062 .0041 1.51525
a
4
(CGE) .0003 .0204 -.01515
a
5
(PAF) -15.7499 185 .813 -.08476
b (O 19.6392 10 .1993 1.9255
b^LME) .0205 .0289 .7093
b
2
(LAI) .5092 .1294 3.92339
b
3
(TI) -.0006 .0024 -.25188
b
4
(GNP) -.00025 .001 -.24613
b
5
(PAF) -6.7804 55 .5841 -.12199
(ME: SSR = 209778 SER = 68,.2769 DW Stat = 2.1649)
(AI: SSR = 21039.1 SER = 21..6225 DW Stat = 2.5125)
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The forecasting accuracy check was done for the nine years
observations of the five countries, using the empirical result above.
The predicted values of 1368-1976 and the actual values of the same
years were applied to the A., F., and U formula which were described in
Section 2. This yielded inequality coefficients (U.) for ME = 0.849 and
AI = 12.278 respectively. The large number of AI, 12.378, is not sur-
prising, since the data in 1967 and 1968 of Singapore predicted this
large result. When the small non-zero numbers were changed to numbers
closer to the predicted values in those specific years, the inequality
coefficient dropped drastically. For example, when the actual AI of
Singapore in 1967 and 1968 were changed to 18.83 and 19.13, which were
the closest numbers to the predicted values, the inequality coefficient
dropped to 1.0009.
To check the forecasting accuracy of the predicted values in
1977, using the 1976 data for five countries, Table III. 8 was constructed.
Table III. 8. Steps and results of the accuracy test of the
individual countries forecasting model.
IND MAL PHIL SIN THAI COMBINED
ME'76(A) 1260 440 553 381 478
AI'76(A) 80 40 60 20 60
ME'77(A) 1311 474 597 401 615
ME'77(F) 1346.5 487.9 365.2 337.3 435.4
AI'77(A) 57 57 57 28 47
AI'77(F) 48.5 51 44 30.1 41.3
AT(ME) .04 .08 .08 .05 .29
AT(AI) -.29 .43 -.05 .4 -.41
FT(ME) .07 .11 .02 -.011 -.09
FT(AI) -.33 .28 -.27 .5 -.48
UT(ME) .7 .41 .72 3.1 1.31 1.33
UT(AI) .37 .35 4.3 .27 .17 .4
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
To get a better analysis of the empirical results from Chapter Three,
this chapter is divided into two parts. The first part is the analysis
of the results from the individual countries of the ASEAN and the second
one is the analysis of the result from the ASEAN countries as a whole.
A. ON INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES
In Chapter Two it was shown that even though the five ASEAN countries
have something in common, the differences among them are a significant
factor which affects the empirical results for both the econometric and
forecasting model, described in Chapter Three. It was necessary to
analyze the individual results of each ASEAN country so that the dif-
ferent behaviors and conditions can be traced and distinguished in order
to explain their effects on the models as a whole. Since for these in-
dividual country data, the sample size requirement for the simultaneous
equation model was hardly satisfied, the OLS procedure is necessary to
distinguish the significant differences between and among the ASEAN
countries.
It is interesting that negative signs are found in some of the
right hand variables on both military and arms imports equations in
both econometric and forecasting models. Since only a few of the t-
statistics of these specific estimated coefficients are significant,
and since FIML is preferable to OLS estimation, these negative signs
are not significant enough to be considered in the process of finding






- Military expenditure equation:
ME = -793.59 + .026GNP + .076CGE + 1992. 5PAF - .937AI
(-.69) (.71) (.89) (-.27) (.65)
(SSR = 62887.2 SER = 112.149 DW Stat = 1.7281)
- Arms imports equation:
AI = -156.02 - .006ME + .007TI + 258.15PAF + .003GNP
(-.74) (.1) (.32) (.44) (.69)
(SSR = 107.77 SER = 14.695 DW Stat = 2.1845)
b. Forecasting Model
- Military expenditure equation:
ME = 2272.92 + .35LME + 11.8LAI -
(5.8) (2.6) (5.75)
.042LGNP + .525LCGE - 3042PAF
(-2.21) (1.16) (-4.4)
(SSR = 3349.48 SER = 33.414 DW Stat = 3.686)
- Arms imports equation:
AI = 19.89 + .08LME - .07LAI
(.12) (1.88) -1.07)
.0004LGNP + .0007LCGE - 162.27PAF
(-.017) (.127) (-.32)
(SSR = 328.954 SER = 10.47 DW Stat = 2.341)
In both ME and AI equations, the forecasting model showed
better results than the econometric model, even though the DW statis-
tic in the forecasting model showed the existence of a small extent of
the negative serial correlation, the results of the SSR, SER and the
t-statistics in the forecasting model have better values than in the
econometric model, for both military expenditure and arms imports
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equation. Some factors of Indonesian behavior related to the arms
transfer model might be considered in the analysis of the results. The
population of the armed forces has been decreasing since 1970. Mili-
tary expenditure jumped in 1975, and this was related to the East Timor
dispute. Consequently, arms imports jumped in 1976 to purchase the
necessary weapons in conjunction with the continuing East Timor dispute.
The decrease of armed forces population and the increase of military
expenditures and arms imports indicated that for Indonesia this decade
was more concentrated in building up the quality not the quantity of




- Military expenditure equation:
ME = -100.42 - .001GNP + .138CGE + 1785. 4PAF + .41AI
(1.36) (.035) (2.37) (.56) (.36)
(SSR = 6886.5 SER = 37.115 DW Stat = 2.2866)
- Arms imports equation:
AI = -156.02 - .036ME + .007TI + 258.15PAF + .003GNP
(.735) (-.1) (.32) (.44) (.69)
(SSR = 1076.77 SER = 14.675 DW Stat = 2.1843)
b. Forecasting model
- Military expenditure equation:
ME = -297.46 - .99LME + 1.63LAI +
(-1.96) (-1.55) (1.14)
.031LGNP + .142LCGE + 5403.04LPAF
(.73) (1.24) (1.44)
(SSR = 5249.62 SER = 41.83 DW Stat = 2.4626)
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- Arms imports equation:
AI = 13.57 + .037LME - .298LAI +
(.255) (.513) (-.72)
.006LGNP - .0198LTI + 2526.9LPAF
(.522) (-1.03) (2.56)
(SSR = 187.727 SER = 7.9105 DW Stat = 2.8321)
Negative serial correlations exist to a small extent in
the forecasting model, as it is shown in the DW statistics, but the
other indicators (SSR, SER and t-statistics) indicate a better result
for the forecasting model of the military expenditures and arms im-
ports in Malaysia. In analyzing the result, some factors in the
Malaysian data sets should be considered.
The arms imports were fluctuating in nine years observa-
tions (1968-1976). 1970 was the year when the smallest amount of arms
imports occurred. The population of armed forces showed an increasing
trend, especially in 1970 when it experienced a big increase. This
explains why arms imports in that year was small, while military expendi-
duture was still increasing in 1970. The military expenditure was con-
centrated to build up the manpower rather than purchasing hardware
weapons. On the contrary, in 1973, while military expenditure was de-
creased slightly, the population of armed forces decreased more and
arms imports jumped. This indicates that during that year, military
expenditure was more concentrated in purchasing the hardware weapons
rather than in building up the manpower. All the GNP, CGE and TI var-
iables have shown an increasing trend.
3. Philippines
a. Econometric Model
- Military expenditure equation:
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ME = -170.2 - .002GNP + .093CGE + 3541.07PAF + .035AI
(-1.58) (-.14) (2.05) (3.86) (.293)
(SSR = 3618.86 SER = 26.9
- Arms imports equation:
AI = 60.89 + .074ME - .0001TI
(1.48) (.62) (-.007)





(SSR = 884.672 SER = 13.302 DW Stat = 2.9486)
b. Forecasting Model









(SSR = 4049.35 SER = 36.739


















(SSR = 374.944 SER = 11.1795 DW Stat = 2.315)
For the Philippines, the econometric model was better than
the forecasting model for the military expenditure equation, but the
reverse was true for the arms imports equation. SSR, SER and t-
stati sties for the military expenditures in the econometric model were
better than in the forecasting model, but for the arms imports equation
the reverse was true. The DW statistics in arms imports estimation in-
dicated the presence of negative serial correlation to a small extent.
Analysis of the actual data is done below to trace the factors that af-
fect the empirical result.
71

The arms imports in 1968-1976 were fluctuating. They
dropped in 1970, jumped in 1972, dropped again in 1973 and jumped again
in 1975. The military expenditures were always increasing and it ex-
perienced a jump in 1975. All of the other variables, GNP, CGE, TI and
PAF had increasing trends.
The results in the accuracy test which was performed in
Chapter III for the Philippines indicated that it was hard to predict
the arms imports values (inequality coefficient U = 4.3). The DW sta-
tistic for the arms imports estimation indicated that there exists some
negative serial correlation in the errors.
The Philippines have no real threat from outside yet, but
the Muslim rebellion and the existence of martial law affect the be-
havior of military expenditures and arms imports.
4. Singapore
a. Econometric Model
- Military expenditure equation:
ME = -242.67 + .19GNP -.19CGE -. 7761PAF + .97AI
(-1.42) (1.63) (-.52) (-.78) (1.06)
(SSR = 16443.4 SER = 57.347 DW Stat = 1.2560)
- Arms imports equation:
AI = -95.9 + .03ME - .012TI - 3535. 2PAF + .06GNP
(-1.07) (.15) (-1.23) (-.83) (1.05)
(SSR = 2496.15 SER = 22.34 DW Stat = 1.648)
b. Forecasting Model
- Military expenditure equation:
ME = -65.09 + .599LME - .372LAI +
(.174) (.72) (-.27)
.126LGNP - -.202LCGE - 7042.6LPAF
(.39) (-.52) (-.17)
(SSR = 278.866 SER = 9.64 DW Stat = 2.2208)
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- Arms imports equation:
AI = -215.34 - .269LME + . 59LAI
(3.58) (-1.99) (2.12)
.01LGNP + . 198LTI - 24730. 7LPAF
(-2.01) (3.88) (-3.68)
(SSR = 278.866 SER = 9.64 DW Stat = 3.3898)
The arms imports estimate for the forecasting equation
shows a better result than in econometric model, but this was reversed
when estimating military expenditures. The DW statistic in both equa-
tions in the econometric model indicated a small extent of positive
serial correlation, while in the forecasting model the DW statistic in-
dicated a small extent of negative serial correlation in the errors.
The results of SSR, SER and t-statistics in the forecasting model for
the military expenditure equations were better than in the econometric
model, but they were better in the econometric model for the arms im-
ports equations. Analysis of the actual data will explain some factors
that might affect this estimation.
Military expenditures and arms imports in 1968 were small,
almost zero for arms imports, since Singapore was a new and small nation
at that time. Since then, Singapore's government always related pur-
chasing arms to the movements of their GNP, CGE and PAF. They took a




- Military expenditure equation.
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ME = 252.71 + .027GNP + . 12CGE
(-5.49) (3.78) (5.02)
(SSR = 1019.93 SER = 14.279
- Arms imports equation:











(SSR = 6382.79 SER = 35.73
b. Forecasting Model
- Military expenditure equations:
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(SSR = 7228.46 SER = 49.0845 DW Stat = 1.9847)
As in the Philippines and Singapore, the forecasting model
for Thailand showed better results for military expenditures estima-
tion and worse for arms imports estimation than the econometric model.
The t-statistics of arms imports estimation for both models shown very
low values. The results of SSR and SER for military expenditures in
the forecasting model, and for arms imports in the econometric model
were better than their counterpart, military expenditures in the econo-
metric model and arms imports in the forecasting model. Analysis of the




Two outliers in the arms imports data in 1968 and 1973 can
be explained as the boom of arms transfers from the US to this area at
the beginning of the Vietnam war and the intensive fights before the
downfall of the South-Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to the communists. The
outliers were not affected by the amounts of military expenditure, GNP
and PAF in those specific years.
B. ON THE ASEAN ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE
Since the estimation included all of the five countries of the ASEAN
alliance as a whole, the above estimated simultaneous equation model can
be applied to both the econometric and the forecasting models with nine
years and five countries observation, that is a sample size of 45. Two
endogenous variables (current ME and AI) and four exogenous variables
(current GNP, CGE, TI and PAF) in the econometric model, and six pre-
determined variables (lagged endogenous LME and LAI, and four lagged
exogenous LGNP, LCGE, LTI and LPAF) in the forecasting model were used
in this estimation. Both models were run through the FIML program in
TSP.
1 . Econometric Model
ME = -996.13 + .01GNP + .019CGE - 133.76PAF + 31.84AI
(-4.38) (.5) (1.83) (-.9) (27.16)
(SSR = 319204 SER = 799.004 DW Stat = 1.3886)
AI = 29.2 - .02ME + .002TI + 6.07PAF + .001GNP
(4.27) (-1.11) (2.2) (1.34) (.84)




ME = 25.68 + .88LME - .26LAI +
(.99) (9.46) (-.57)
.006LGNP + .003LCGE - 15.75LPAF
(1.51) (-.02) (-.08)
(SSR = 209778 SER = 21.6225 DW Stat = 2.5125)
The t-statistics in the estimated coefficients which have
positive signs are always more significant than which have negative
signs. It means that in all events, the increase in the predetermined
variables will imply the increase of the predicted values of military
expenditures and arms imports.
Analyzing the results of the t-statistics, the sum of
squared residuals and the standard error of the regression, it turns
out that the forecasting model in this simultaneous model has better
results than the econometric model on both the military expenditure
equation and the arms imports equation. The Durbin-Watson statistics in
the econometric model indicated positive serial correlations in both
equations. In the forecasting model, only did the arms imports equation
indicate a small extent of negative serial correlations.
To check the results geometrically, the data set of ME, AI,
GNP, CGE, TI and PAF in 1968-1976 are applied to both the econometric
and forecasting models. The plots of ME and AI for both econometric and
forecasting models can be seen in Figures IV.l.a and b, IV. 2, IV. 3 and
IV. 4. a and b. Figures II. 5, IV. 1 and IV. 4 are plotted twice, Figures a
are simultaneous plots and Figures b are plotted separately by indivi-
dual country data due to many similar values occurs during same years.
In the econometric model, the plots of the predicted
values of ME (Figures IV.l.a and b) are similar to the plots of the
76

actual values of AI (Figures II. 5. a and b), and the plots of the pre-
dicted values of AI (Figure IV. 2) are only slightly similar to the
plots of the actual values of ME (Figure II. 4). That explains the be-
havior of simultaneity of the econometric model. In this case, the
military expenditures seem to be more dependent than the arms imports,
i.e., a small change in arms imports values will affect the military
expenditures values, while some changes in military expenditures values
might or might not affect the values of arms imports.
In the forecasting model, the plots of the actual values
(Figure II. 4) and the predicted values of ME (Figure IV. 3) are similar
to the plots of actual values (Figures II. 5. a and b) and the predicted
values of AI (Figures IV. 4. a and b). These similarities explain the
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FIGURE IV. la
The plots of the predicted values of military














The plots of the predicted values of military
expenditures in the econometric model 1968-1976
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FIGURE IV. 4a
The plots of the forecasted values














The plots of the forecasted values
of arms imports
1968-1976
(country data are plotted separately due to




The proposed models emphasize the significant role of the simul-
taneity of the military expenditures and arms imports in all of the
five nations of the ASEAN.
As a part of the third world, the ASEAN nations have experineced
military expenditure growth. The reasons for this growth in some
cases, parallel with the study by Whynes £12]:
- Security: ASEAN nations have the same threat, the communists.
- Internal repression: With the ethnic diversity described in
Chapter Two, each of the ASEAN countries has its own internal problems.
- Military vested interest: To maintain the military role in their
administration, most of the ASEAN nations need to build up their mili-
tary power by increasing military expenditures.
- The need of ideology and national identity: As developing
countries, all of the ASEAN nations need to show their ideology and
national identity, and these need military strength, which of course
increase military expenditures.
In the analysis in Chapter Four, though the t-statistics did not
always show significance, the models successfully demonstrated that
the military expenditure growth is affected by the changes of the exo-
genous variables, i.e., gross national product, central government ex-
penditures, population of the armd forces and total imports, and by the
other endogenous variable, arms imports. Military expenditures seems to
be more dependent than arms imports.
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The forecasting accuracy test that was done in Chapter Three dealt
only with ex-post forecasting. Since the model does not have the pre-
dicted values of GNP, CGE, TI and PAF, the ex-ante forecasting must
have a way to include the values of the lagged exogenous variables in
predicting the endogenous variables.
The forecasting model can be modified to a simulation model to fore-
cast the values of military expenditures and arms imports in some future
years. This simulation model uses the predicted values of ME and AI as
the predetermined variables LME and LAI, and using the trend rate of
exogenous variables, were obtained from applying the nine years obser-
vations (1967-1975) to the forecasting model, is used to compute the
values of the predetermined variables LGNP, LCGE, LTI and LPAF. Further
discussion and analysis of the simulation model is beyond the scope of
this thesis. The idea might be useful in the policy analysis of the
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